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Abstract:  In arguing that insect brains are capable of sentience, Klein & Barron rely heavily on 
Bjorn Merker’s claim that activity in the human mid-brain is sufficient for conscious experience. I 
criticize Merker’s claim by pointing out that the behaviors supported by midbrain activity are much 
more primitive than the ones that appear to depend on consciousness. I raise a similar objection 
to Klein & Barron’s contention that insect behaviors are similar to behaviors that manifest 
consciousness in human beings. The similarity is weak. I also respond to the related view that 
integrative activity in mid-brain structures is sufficient to explain the sensory integration that 
characterizes human perceptual experience. There is good reason to think that the cortex makes 
additional contributions to experiential integration. 
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Klein & Barron (K & B) (2016) claim that insects are capable of perceptual consciousness. Their 
main argument for this view runs as follows: 
First premise: Certain types of midbrain activity are sufficient for subjective experiences in 
human beings and other vertebrates (Barron & Klein 2016, p. 2). 
Second premise: Insect brains are functionally isomorphic to vertebrate midbrains 
in all the respects that are relevant to conscious experience (K & B, p. 5). 
Conclusion: Insects probably have subjective experiences.  
As K & B point out, this argument leads immediately to the claim that insects have a form of 
consciousness, because there is a “very basic sense of ‘conscious’ that refers to the basic capacity 
to have subjective experience” (K & B, p. 2).  
What exactly do the authors mean by subjective experience? I don’t think there’s a clear 
answer in K & B, but we can see what they have in mind by considering the following passages 
from Barron & Klein (2016): 
 
“In vertebrates the capacity for subjective experience is supported by integrated structures in the 
midbrain that create a neural simulation of the state of the mobile animal in space. This integrated 
and egocentric representation of the world from the animal’s perspective is sufficient for subjective 
experience.” (Abstract) 
 





“[T][he human midbrain subserves the basic capacity for subjective experience. It does so in virtue 
of producing an integrated simulation of the state of the animal’s own mobile body within the 
environment.” (p. 2)  
 
Expanding on these passages, in the light of various supplementary comments K & B make, we 
can say that in their view, a subjective experience is a spatiotemporal model of the environment 
that integrates information from the various senses and represents egocentric spatial relations 
between perceived objects and the subject. They also hold that every subjective experience has 
a proprietary phenomenology (K & B, p. 1). Thus, they mean to be discussing what is known to 
philosophers as “phenomenal consciousness.”  
K & B are to be congratulated and thanked for questioning the widely received view that 
consciousness is a cortical phenomenon. Without such challenges, science and philosophy fall into 
dogmatic slumbers. Inevitably, however, there are reasons for concern. The most important of 
these is that K & B say very little in defense of what appears to be their central claim – that certain 
representations in the human midbrain are sufficient for conscious experiences. Instead of giving 
detailed arguments for this sufficiency thesis, they refer their readers to the work of Merker 
(2007). I think this is a mistake because, as far as I can tell, Merker’s reasoning leaves a lot to be 
desired.  
  Merker offers several arguments that purport to establish an intimate relation between 
midbrain activity and consciousness, but most of them could at best establish a necessity thesis. 
Thus, for example, he points out that consciousness can be significantly impaired and even 
suspended by interventions in the midbrain. This argues for necessity but is irrelevant to 
sufficiency. To make a case for sufficiency, Merker has to provide evidence for consciousness in 
subjects who either lack a cortex altogether or possess it only in highly attenuated form. He tries 
to meet this obligation by appealing to children who are afflicted with hydrocephalus. He 
maintains that these patients are capable of a range of behaviors that accompany consciousness 
in normal subjects. For the most part, however, his examples are not convincing, because the 
behaviors tend to be much more primitive than the ones that plausibly require consciousness. His 
examples include orienting to objects and visually tracking them as they move. These behaviors 
are no evidence of consciousness. Blindsight patients can orient to objects that are presented in 
their blind fields, and they are also capable of tracking such objects (Weiskrantz 2009). Merker 
also cites the expressions of emotion shown by hydrocephalic children, pointing out that they can 
occur even when the cortex is virtually annihilated. But again, the behaviors he cites are too 
primitive to count as good evidence for consciousness. Like the similar displays of infants, they 
can be explained as behavioral manifestations of unconscious needs, designed to trigger nurturing 
responses in solicitous parents.1 
     In addition to the official argument that I cited in my first paragraph, it is possible to extract 
two others from the target article. I am not sure whether they were intended as stand-alone 
arguments, but they have a certain prima facie appeal and it seems best to take note of them. 
One is just that perceptual integration takes place in the midbrain, particularly in the superior 
colliculus. Information from all of the spatial senses is represented there, and the structural 
relationships among the representations are strongly indicative of integration. Since, as we saw, 
K & B emphasize perceptual integration in their account of subjective experience, it might seem 
appropriate for them to conclude that the midbrain is the seat of subjective experience. The 





trouble is that the brain contains multiple sites, including cortical sites, where perceptual 
representations are integrated. Consider awareness of speech, which binds together visual and 
auditory information. It is plausible that such awareness has a cortical ground, given its complexity 
and availability to higher cognitive faculties, such as those that are responsible for forming and 
testing beliefs. There is also experimental evidence for cortical integration of perceptual 
information. Thus, for example, it appears that when transcranial magnetic stimulation is applied 
to the posterior parietal cortex, it can interfere with the processes that bind visual and tactual 
information. This demonstrates a causal connection between cortical activity and multisensory 
integration (Pasalar et al. 2010). 
I turn now to a third argument for insect consciousness. Unlike the first two, which depend 
crucially on the claim that certain types of midbrain activity are sufficient for human perceptual 
consciousness, this third one sets aside questions about midbrain activity and focuses instead on 
a direct analogy between human experiences and states of insect brains. Let us use “I-states” as 
a term for the states of insect brains that K & B believe to be conscious. The idea is that I-states 
play causal roles in the lives of insects that are very similar to the causal roles that conscious 
experiences play in us. Developing this idea, K & B claim that I-states (i) support assessments of 
the significance of various external objects for the organism, given its current needs; (ii) support 
processes integrating current information about the environment with information that is stored 
in memory; (iii) support planning of courses of action, including courses of action that are directed 
on goals that are not currently perceived; and (iv) support decision making. These are all 
properties of conscious experiences in human beings, so there are grounds for thinking that the 
insect states in question are conscious experiences. 
Or so it might seem. In fact, however, reflection shows that this line of thought is 
vulnerable to an objection like the one to Merker’s claims about victims of hydrocephalus. It is no 
doubt true that bees and flies engage in activities that bear some degree of resemblance to such 
human activities as evaluating objects, planning, decision making, and forming and testing beliefs, 
but there is plenty of room for doubt that they are capable of the complex forms of the latter 




1. As is widely recognized, there is good reason to think that we are endowed with quick but very dirty heuristics for 
attributing complex mental states to other beings. Arguably this is what is at work when we respond to the primitive 
behavioral displays of children with virtually no cortex by attributing emotions to them. (The existence of such 
heuristics is illustrated by a famous video by Heider and Simmel (1944). In the video, simple two-dimensional shapes 
(two triangles and a circle) move in ways that are characteristic of biological creatures, and as a result, viewers find 
it almost irresistible to ascribe complex emotions to them — even though, on reflection, they recognize that ascribing 
emotions to two-dimensional shapes is absurd. The difference between the shapes in the video and severely afflicted 
children is that it’s more difficult to second guess the results of the heuristics in the latter case, because the beings 
have an outwardly human form. But of course, having a human form provides no additional evidence of conscious 
emotional experience.)   
 
2. I thank Casey O’Callaghan for very helpful advice. 
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